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Abstract 
In this paper, we provide some descriptive statistics of the first twenty years of the WTO (World Trade 
Organization) dispute settlement that we have extracted from the data set that we have put together, 
and made publicly available  
(http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu/wto-case-law-project/ ). The statistical information that we 
present here is divided into three thematic units: the statutory and de facto duration of each stage of the 
process, paying particular attention to the eventual conclusion of litigation; the identity and 
participation in the process of the various institutional players, that is, not only complainants and 
defendants, but also third parties, as well as the WTO judges (panelists and Appellate Body members); 
and, finally, information regarding the subject-matter of various disputes, regarding the frequency with 
which claims regarding consistency of measures with the covered agreements (but also, at a more 
disaggregate level, e.g., specific provisions) have been raised. We call our work “descriptive 
statistics”, because, in an effort to provide raw material that will help researchers to conduct their 
research as they see fit, we have consciously refrained from systematically interpreting the data that 
we have assembled. 
Keywords 
WTO; Dispute Settlement; Panel; Appellate Body 
JEL Classification: K40 
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1. Introductory Remarks* 
The WTO dispute settlement system, often referred to as the crown jewel of the system, is unique in 
international relations in that it is the only comprehensive compulsory third party adjudication regime. 
Members of the WTO can solve disputes that might arise from the operation of the WTO contract, 
exclusively through recourse to the procedures established in the DSU, the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, that is, the agreement organizing adjudication of disputes (Article 23.2 of DSU). WTO 
members, in other words, cannot take justice in their own hands, in application of the Roman Law 
maxim ‘no one should be the judge of its own cause’ (nemo judex in causa sua).  
This (compulsory third party adjudication) is not the only remarkable feature of the DSU. To ease 
access to justice, or better, to avoid denial of justice, WTO members agreed during the Uruguay round 
to have their disputes adjudicated by independent, impartial judges every time that a willing 
complainant had expressed his desire to this effect. This is the notorious ‘negative consensus’, which 
complements Article 23.2 of DSU, in that it removes the possibility for defendants to block access to 
justice.
1
 These two provisions, along with the understanding that the WTO is a self-enforcing regime,
2
 
make the ‘DSU-think’ so to speak, the quintessential features of WTO adjudication.  
The DSU aims at removing disputes from the docket, if possible (Article 3.7 of DSU). If bilateral 
resolution fails, then the only way to resolve disputes, as already explained, would be through 
submission to an independent adjudicator. Losing parties will be called to comply with adverse 
rulings, or face retaliation equalling the damage inflicted through the illegal act.  
More concretely, the WTO establishes a two-stage adjudication process, whereby disputes will be 
first submitted to panels (‘first instance’ courts, competent to discuss both the factual record, as well as 
the relevant legal discipline), and, eventually to the Appellate Body (AB), that is, the ‘second instance’ 
court within the WTO regime, the mandate of which does not allow it to extend its review beyond the 
understanding of the legal issues involved. Whereas the composition of panels depends every time on 
the preferences of WTO members and the WTO Secretariat, the AB has a ‘fixed’ composition, and its 
members serve for a four-year term, renewable only once.  
Assuming a favourable for the complainant judgment, the defendant will be called to bring its 
measures into compliance with its obligations. If it fails to do so, it might be facing retaliation. If it 
manages to comply, the case will be resolved. For compliance to occur though, the agreement of the 
complainant, to the effect that the measures adopted were adequate, is necessary. In case of 
disagreement on this score, disputes will be submitted to ‘compliance panels’ (and eventually, the 
AB), which are requested to pronounce on the adequacy of measures adopted during the reasonable 
period of time that defendants enjoy to this effect (Article 21.5 of DSU).  
If defendant stays idle, or if a compliance panel (and/or the AB, as the case may be) pronounce on 
the inadequacy of adopted measures, then defendant might be facing retaliation. The framers of the 
DSU did not manage to agree on a clear method to calculate the amount of retaliation. They used the 
term ‘substantially equivalent concessions’ that would serve as the legal benchmark for calculating 
                                                     
*
 We would like to thank Aris Georgopoulos, and Bernard M. Hoekman for useful comments on prior drafts. The data set 
has been prepared thanks to financial assistance received from the European University Institute (EUI), Florence (Italy). 
1
 In his remarkable study, Hudec (1993) explains why acceding to compulsory third party adjudication and negative 
consensus was the product of incremental evolution, rather than paradigm shift. This is probably the reason why this 
example has not been emulated in other fora that have not witnessed similar institutional evolution in this respect. 
Mavroidis (2016) explains in detail the mechanics of the negotiation during the Uruguay round that established through 
statutory language the current regime. 
2
 By this, we mean that there is no possibility of third party enforcement in the WTO. It is WTO members that bring 
disputes against other WTO members, see Schwartz and Sykes (2002) on this score. 
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retaliation. Disputing parties might disagree on the amount of retaliation, and disputes on this score 
will be submitted to an Arbitrator (the original panel, whenever possible), which will decide on the 
appropriate amounts (Article 22.6 of DSU). Awards by the Arbitrator on this score are not subject to 
appeal.
3
 Retaliation can lawfully take place only following authorization to suspend (tariff) 
concessions (that is, raise the level of customs duties on imports from the recalcitrant WTO member). 
The defendant is still under the obligation to eventually bring its measures into compliance, and has to 
observe specific reporting requirements to this effect (Articles 21.6 and 22.8 of DSU). Suspension of 
concessions is ‘temporary’ as per the explicit wording of the DSU )Article 22.8 of DSU), but no 
statutory deadline for its expiry is provided. Consequently, whereas de jure the DSU (Article 22.1) 
calls for ‘property rules’, that is, for the obligation to perform the contract, de facto it tolerates 
‘liability rules’, that is, the possibility for authors of an illegality to ‘buy their way out of the 
contract’.4  
This is, briefly, a description of the DSU, the subject-matter of our paper.  
WTO courts, as a result of the institutional innovations mentioned above as well, continue, twenty 
years following their advent, to be the busiest courts litigating state-to-state disputes. In fact, at the 
moment of writing (December 31, 2016), 514 disputes had been initiated.
5
 Although the number of 
disputes has dwindled down over the years, WTO courts continue to be quite busy, as they adjudicate 
consistently over 15 disputes per year, as Table 1 shows. 
Table 1: Average Number of Disputes per 5 year intervals 
 
1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015 
39.4 28.9 16.3 19.5 13 
 
  
                                                     
3
 The DSU is discussed in detail in Palmeter and Mavroidis (2006). Davey (2014) provides an excellent survey of its 
technical evolution over time, since the inception of the GATT. 
4
 Schwartz and Sykes (2000) detail how this can happen. 
5
 Our data set covers a slightly reduced number, and our unit of account (e.g., a “dispute”) does not correspond with the 
unit of account used in the WTO webpage for the reasons that we explain later in Section 1 of this paper.  
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Figure 1 (FORMER Figure 2.2) Average Number of Requests for Establishment of Panel per 
Year 
 
Figure 2 Average Number of Notices of Appeal per Year 
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Figures 1, and 2, evidence the number of requests for consultations per year (Figure 1), as well as the 
number of disputes initiated before WTO panels, and the WTO Appellate Body (Figure 2).
6
 Absolute 
numbers do not, of course, tell a convincing story. And yet, when placed in context these numbers are 
quite impressive. Compare for example, with the number of disputes raised before the ICJ 
(International Court of Justice), which, like the WTO is a state-to-state court, but which, unlike the 
WTO adjudicates disputes in all areas of international law, and not simply trade. It has adjudicated so 
far, according to information provided in its official webpage,
7
 a total of 161 disputes. Were one to 
consider the fact that the number of states that can submit disputes to the ICJ surpasses that of the 
WTO membership by one third, that the ICJ has been hearing disputes since 1947 (as opposed to 1995 
for the WTO), and that the ICJ also knows of nonlitigious procedures (advisory opinions, an 
impossibility as far as WTO courts are concerned), then one can better appreciate how busy WTO 
courts have been in the twenty years since their advent. Furthermore, as we will discuss in the 
concluding Section, even though the overall number of disputes has diminished in the last ten years 
(compared to the first ten), no forum diversion is observed. WTO members continue to submit their 
disputes before the WTO, and not to other bodies.  
Compared to the 2011 edition of our data-set,
8
 we have included 81 more disputes in this edition. 
The total of disputes that we discuss here is 529, but this number needs an explanation. We discuss all 
disputes raised between January 1, 1995, and June 30, 2016. According to the official WTO webpage 
(www.wto.org), DS 507 was the last dispute raised during that time. Some of the DS numbers 
between DS1 and DS507 nevertheless, could refer to multi-party disputes. We explain.  
WTO disputes are, as we have briefly indicated already, formally initiated through filings of 
‘Requests for Consultations’. It could be the case that more than one complainant has drafted a 
‘Request for Consultations’. A single DS (dispute settlement) number (e.g., DS1, DS2 etc.) is assigned 
thus, to Requests of Consultations that might concern one complainant and one defendant, or more 
complainants and one defendant. We do not follow this method of counting. We convert the data into 
“bilateral” dispute form. That is, if two WTO members are complaining against a third member, we 
count each one of them as having one “dispute” each with the third member. A specific DS number 
could thus, be divided into two “bilateral” disputes. On the other hand, it is not always the case that 
two different dispute numbers are allocated when two distinct WTO members complain about the 
same measure, however.  
To illustrate this point, we could refer to Argentina-Import Measures, where three complainants 
requested the establishment of a panel. Three different disputes were initiated and three different DS 
(dispute settlement) numbers were allocated to the litigation (DS438, 444, 445). We treat this litigation 
as three bilateral disputes. In EC-Bananas III, conversely, only one DS number (DS27) was allocated 
to a dispute involving five complainants against the EU (European Union). We treat this litigation as 
five bilateral disputes.
9
 We thus, arrive at the number 529, the number of disputes that feature in our 
data set.
10
 
                                                     
6
 As we explain in more detail in this Section, a WTO dispute is formally initiated through a request for consultations, 
which, if proved unsuccessful, could lead to a two-stage adjudication before panels (first instance), and the Appellate 
Body (second instance). 
7
 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2 
8
 Horn et al. (2011). 
9
 This discrepancy is due to the fact that defendants can object to request by WTO Members to become co-complainants in 
disputes that have already been initiated, and/or disagreements regarding decisions to merge procedures relating to the 
same subject-matter (Articles 4.11 and 9 of DSU). 
10
 We are not advocating of course, that our counting method is more appropriate than, for example, that included in the 
DSU. It has the merit though of providing a symmetry with regard to the number of participants per disputes, as well as 
of being consistent with the method we have been using since we first established our data set.  
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With all this information in the background, we can now move to discuss our data set. In Section 2, 
we provide information about the duration of the process, disaggregated in its different stages. We will 
be comparing statutory deadlines to practice. In Section 3, we focus on the institutional players. It is in 
this Section that we will be discussing the frequency of participation before panel and/or AB 
proceedings of the various complainants and defendants, as well as their percentage of wins and losses 
before panels and the AB. In similar vein, we will be presenting our data regarding the identity of 
panellists and members of the AB, the frequency of their participation in proceedings, and their 
national origin. Section 4 is dedicated to a discussion of the subject-matter of disputes. We will 
provide information at an aggregate- (the frequency of invoking specific agreements), as well at a 
disaggregated level (the frequency of invoking specific provisions). At the end of the day, the reader 
will have information regarding who (is complaining/complained against), what (is complained 
about), and how (disputes are resolved). In a short Section 5, we will present briefly the main 
conclusions of this study.  
Before we go any further though, let us introduce at this stage our classification of the 164 now 
WTO members. The WTO does not formally distinguish between its members, other than a vague 
reference to developing countries. Nevertheless, WTO members are free to suggest whether they 
belong to one or the other category, and abuses have on occasion occurred.
11
 One subgroup of 
developing countries, namely the LDCs (least developed countries), that is, the poorest countries in the 
developing countries’ group, is clearly determined in various WTO documents that have incorporated 
the UN (United Nations) classification to this effect.
12
 For the rest, the distinction between 
industrialized (developed), and developing countries is more like a line in the sand, than set in stone. 
We are thus, obliged to come up with our own classification. As with any other non-statutory 
classification, one might be accused for arbitrariness. In defence of our classification, we will state that 
we distinguish between homogeneous groups. There is lot of references in literature to the BRICS 
group, comprising of Brazil, China, Russia, India, and South Africa. It is true that they have on 
occasion formed a political alliance, as it is also true that they exhibit comparable levels of 
development. South Africa nevertheless, is one third of the population of Russia, the second least 
populated member of BRICS. As the size of the internal market is the main reason why we would like 
to distinguish BRICS from the other developing countries, we have instead cut out South Africa and 
distinguish between BRIC and remaining developing countries in our data set.  
We thus distinguish between five groups, the first two belonging to the industrialized world, 
whereas the last three to the developing world: 
 
G2 EU (European Union), and US (United States) 
IND 
All members of the OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development), the club of industrialized countries, other than EU, US 
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China, the biggest markets in the developing world 
LDCs The least developed countries 
DEV  All remaining developing countries 
                                                     
11
 For a discussion of this issue, see Mavroidis (2016a), vol. 1, Chapter 5. 
12
 The latest UN resolution adopting the list of LDCs is UN Doc. A/RES/70/253, of February 12, 2016. It comprises 48 
countries. Since graduation to the developing countries group is possible (as is retrocession to the LDCs group), the list 
announces that five years from its adoption, Angola will graduate (as of February 2, 20121). 
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The emerging picture thus, is as follows: 
Table 2: Our Classification of the WTO Membership 
G2 Brunei Darussalam Namibia LDC 
EU Cabo Verde Nicaragua Angola 
US Cameroon Nigeria Bangladesh 
 
Chile Oman Benin 
BRIC Colombia Pakistan Burkina Faso 
Brazil Congo Panama Burundi 
India Costa Rica Papua New Guinea Cambodia 
Russian Federation Côte d'Ivoire Paraguay Central African Republic 
China Cuba Peru Chad 
 
Dominica Philippines Congo, Dem. Rep. of 
IND Dominican Republic Qatar Djibouti 
Australia Ecuador Saint Kitts and Nevis Gambia 
Canada Egypt Saint Lucia Guinea 
Croatia El Salvador 
Saint Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
Guinea-Bissau 
Hong Kong, China Fiji Samoa Haiti 
Israel Gabon Saudi Arabia Lao 
Japan Georgia Seychelles Lesotho 
Korea Ghana South Africa Madagascar 
Liechtenstein Grenada Sri Lanka Malawi 
Mexico Guatemala Suriname Maldives 
New Zealand Guyana Swaziland Mali 
Norway Honduras Chinese Taipei Mauritania 
Singapore Indonesia Tajikistan Mozambique 
Switzerland Jamaica Tanzania Myanmar 
Turkey Jordan Thailand Nepal 
 
Kazakhstan Macedonia Niger 
DEV Kenya Tonga Rwanda 
Albania Kuwait Trinidad and Tobago Senegal 
Antigua and Barbuda Kyrgyz Republic Tunisia Sierra Leone 
Argentina Macao, China Ukraine Solomon Islands 
Armenia Malaysia United Arab Emirates Togo 
Bahrain Mauritius Uruguay Uganda 
Barbados Moldova Venezuela Vanuatu 
Belize Mongolia  Viet Nam Yemen 
Bolivia Montenegro Zimbabwe Zambia 
Botswana Morocco 
  
2. The Process 
In this Section, we discuss the various statutory deadlines applicable to the various stages of the 
process, and compare them with practice. 
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2.1 The Importance of Statutory Deadlines 
Contrary to GATT practice, the DSU provides for specific deadlines within which each stage of the 
process must be completed. Various provisions of the DSU stipulate thus, time limits that, in principle, 
should be observed. As an illustration, we mention the following: 
a) Article 4.7 of DSU states that the complainant can, sixty days after the receipt of the Request for 
Consultations, assuming that no satisfactory solution has been found by that time, request the 
establishment of a panel; 
b) Parties to the dispute can request from the WTO DG (Director-General) to appoint panelists, if 
they have not managed to agree upon the panel composition within twenty days (Article 8.7 of 
DSU); 
c) Proceedings before panels should not exceed six months, unless panels, after it has informed the 
DSB (Dispute Settlement Body),
13
 feel that they require nine months to complete their review of 
the case (Article 12.9 of DSU); 
d) In similar vein, proceedings before the AB should not exceed sixty days, unless the AB, having 
informed the DSB, decides that it needs ninety days to complete its review of the case before it 
(Article 17.5 of DSU). 
Appendix 3 to the DSU provides in its paragraph 12 an indicative list of the time-table for the whole 
process. Why did the members of the WTO decide to restrain time-wise each stage of the process? To 
a large extent this was a US request during the negotiations.  
The last years of the GATT are marked with an unusually high percentage of unadopted panel 
reports, as Hudec (1993) explains in his study.
14
 The US was at the receiving end of this practice, 
which to a large extent concerned disputes about farm trade. Since it could not obtain justice before 
the GATT, the US took, in a matter of speaking, justice to its own hands, aggressively enforcing its 
own perceptions of international trade on its trading partners. Section 301, a rather innocuous 
instrument, which was part and parcel of the US Trade Act of 1974 and which was designed to serve 
as instrument for private parties to alert the USTR (United States Trade representative), and persuade 
it to represent their claims in fora where only governments had standing, became anathema to the 
world trading community. Section 301 offered to private parties to alert the USTR about ‘illegal’ (in 
the US view) trade practices by foreign nations in areas not covered by the GATT, like services and 
intellectual property, which US lobbies cherished, and wanted to see international trading rules 
emerge.
15
  
                                                     
13
 The DSB is the body administering the DSU. It decides all issues by consensus, as per the usual GATT/WTO practice, 
except for decision regarding the request for consultations, establishment of panel/AB, adoption of panel/AB report, 
arbitration to determine the reasonable period of time and/or the level of countermeasures, where it adopts its decisions 
on negative consensus. Each member of the WTO has one representative at the DSB.  
14
 All reports by GATT panels were submitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES (the term expressed in block letters refers 
to the highest GATT organ). Unless adopted by consensus, panel reports would have no legal value, and would become 
relevant only if subsequent panels dealing with the same issue were persuaded by the reasoning therein. At any rate, 
unadopted panel reports would not oblige the unsuccessful defendant to implement their rulings. The GATT refers of 
course, to the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, the predecessor to the WTO. Following the advent of the WTO, 
the GATT was reduced from a de facto international organization, to an agreement regulating trade in goods coming 
under the aegis of the WTO, the institutional umbrella for trade liberalization.  
15
 Bhagwati (1990), and Milner (1990) explain how, in defiance of the coverage of the GATT, US lobbies managed to 
advance their agenda, and how, based on similar requests, the US government requested during the Uruguay round the 
extension of the international trading regime to cover trade in services (what eventually became the GATS, General 
Agreement on Trade in Services), and intellectual property rights (what became the TRIPs, Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights) in the WTO-era.  
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Crucially, action under Section 301 was subjected to specific deadlines that the USTR had to 
comply with when processing private requests for relief.
16
 Mavroidis (2016) studied the negotiating 
record, and reports that a very substantial part of the DSU negotiation focused on emulating the 
Section 301 deadlines at the multilateral level. The idea was that, by adopting a strict calendar for 
processing disputes at the multilateral level, as well as by doing away with the onerous consensus-
requirement for establishment of panels and adoption of their reports, the US would be, as a quid pro 
quo, willing to abandon aggressive unilateralism, and accept submission of all trade disputes to 
compulsory third party adjudication. In this respect, the bargain has proved a success. 
Statutory deadlines thus, are not a trivial issue as it might seem, but a rather important negotiated 
settlement. 
2.2 Practice 
With this is in mind we provide, in what now follows, a series of tables that detail the duration of each 
stage of the proceedings in practice. We start with a generic Table, which relays the duration for each 
stage of the proceedings. 
Table 3: Duration of Each Stage of Proceedings 
Average length of process, months 
Statutory 
deadline 
Mean 
Consultations 
From the date of Request of consultations to the 
establishment of panel 
2 months 6.6 
Panel 
proceedings 
From the establishment of panel to circulation of the 
panel report 
6 months 15.1 
Appeals 
From the date of the Notice of Appeal until the date 
of the circulation of the Appellate Body 
2–3 
months 
3.3 
RPT, Bilateral 
agreement 
Total length of agreed period between parties of RPT 
during which implementation must occur. 
 11.6 
RPT, Arbitration 
Award 
The average RPT awarded by the arbitrator in the 
awards circulated. 
 9.6 
Compliance 
panel 
From the date of the request to establish a first 
compliance panel until the date of circulation of the 
Compliance Panel Report. 
3 months 8.7 
AB compliance 
From the date of the first Notice of Appeal until the 
date of circulation of the Appellate Body compliance 
report. 
 3.4 
                                                     
16
 Hippler Bello and Holmer (1990), and Hudec (1990) explain the statutory language and rationale for this issue in detail. 
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The reader would realize by comparing practice to statutory deadlines that the former almost always 
exceeds the latter, a point to which we will return at the end of this Section. Furthermore, there is 
evidence by now that it pays to make unreasonable demands when there is discretion to decide on the 
duration of a process. Under Article 21.3(c) of DSU for example, it is an Arbitrator that will decide on 
the reasonable period of time during which implementation of rulings included in a panel and/or AB 
report should occur. The DSU provides for a statutory limit (fifteen months), which serves as 
guideline, Arbitrators remaining free to decide on longer (as well as on shorter) periods for 
implementation. Empirical research by Mavroidis et al. (2017) shows that complainants consistently 
request for short, even on occasion unrealistic periods of implementation, whereas defendants for 
lengthy periods. Arbitrators almost smack dab to the middle the period within which they decide that 
implementation should occur.  
Similar evidence is available from practice under Article 22.6 of DSU.
17
 Complainants will 
overshoot the damage they have suffered as a result of illegalities, whereas defendants will 
underestimate it. Arbitrators will almost always come up with numbers between the two. 
With this in mind, we now turn to more disaggregated data regarding specific stages of the process, 
and we kick off our discussion with data regarding the duration of consultations. 
Figure 3: Duration of Consultations 
 
  
                                                     
17
 Bown and Brewster (2016) discuss this issue in detail. 
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Table 4: Duration of Consultations by Group 
  
Respondents 
 
  
BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
Complainants 
BRIC 
 
9.5 5.9 14.0 6.8 
DEV 5.5 4.9 5.9 10.3 6.2 
G2 6.5 6.4 8.0 6.9 7.0 
IND 7.3 8.4 5.7 5.7 6.2 
 
Total 6.6 6.4 6.3 7.6 6.6 
It follows that, whereas complainants can request establishment of a panel sixty days after the receipt 
of the Request for Consultations (Article 4.7 of DSU), in practice the average consultation lasts 
substantially longer. Busch and Reinhardt (2001) have discussed this issue, and show why it might be 
in the interest of both parties (on occasion) to press for a deal through consultations, than to bring their 
dispute out in the open.
18
 Although, as we show in the Table that follows, the propensity to resolve a 
dispute through consultations has been reduced over time, still almost two thirds of all disputes 
formally raised before the WTO are resolved at this stage of the proceedings.  
  
                                                     
18
 Compare Guzman and Simmons (2003). 
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Figure 4: Settlements at Consultations in Time-Series Mode 
 
We now shift to discuss duration of panel and AB proceedings in practice. We provide information 
regarding the mean (how long do panels and the AB take to resolve a dispute on average?), as well as 
information in time-series mode, which allows the reader to observe whether trends emerge.
19
 
  
                                                     
19
 The argument has been raised within the WTO that, although less disputes were submitted to the WTO in the second 
decade of its existence, the complexity of disputes has increased. It is of course difficult to measure complexity, and one 
of the relevant indicators to this effect could be the number of claims raised per dispute. In our 2011 paper, we provided 
evidence to the effect that the number of claims raised per dispute does not affect the overall duration of the process. 
Other factors as well could of course affect ‘complexity’. In this vein we could think of novel issues that had never been 
raised before, or of issues that had been addressed in incoherent manner in case law. Anyway and for whatever reasons, 
the WTO has substantially increased the number of lawyers working in the various Divisions of the WTO dealing with 
dispute settlement. From less than ten in total at the moment of creation of the WTO, almost sixty lawyers are now being 
employed, and over one third of them has been hired in the last three years. Davey (2015), and Mavroidis (2015) discuss 
this issue in detail.  
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Figure 5: Duration of Panel Proceedings  
 
Table 5: Complainants and Defendants by Group at Panel Proceedings 
  Respondent 
(Panel) 
 
  BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
Complainant 
(Panel) 
BRIC . 12.0 13.7 11.0 13.4 
DEV 7.0 14.8 14.4 14.0 14.3 
G2 16.3 14.3 18.8 14.1 16.0 
IND 16.8 13.4 15.7 14.7 15.3 
 Total 16.1 14.2 15.6 14.0 15.1 
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Figure 6: Duration of AB Proceedings 
 
Table 6: Complainants and Defendants by Group at AB Proceedings 
  Respondent 
(AB) 
 
  
BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
Complainant 
(AB) 
BRIC 
  
3.3 3.0 3.2 
DEV 2.0 4.0 3.0 
 
3.1 
G2 3.4 2.9 4.1 2.9 3.4 
IND 4.0 4.0 3.2 2.8 3.3 
 
Total 3.5 3.4 3.3 2.9 3.3 
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Figure 7: Duration of Panel Proceedings in Time-Series Mode  
 
Figure 8: Duration of AB Proceedings in Time-Series Mode 
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2.3 Practice Defies Statutes  
In light of the above, one might legitimately ask the question whether it makes sense to readjust the 
statutory deadlines, which panels for one consistently overstep. Some discussion to this effect has 
already taken place in the context of the ongoing DSU Review.
20
 Arguments in favour and against 
have been heard, the latter focusing on the disciplining effect of ‘tight’ deadlines which, if absent, 
could lead panels to spend even more time per dispute. 
3. The Institutional Players 
We now turn our attention to the institutional players in WTO dispute adjudication. By ‘institutional 
players’, one usually understands the WTO members of course, the WTO judges (panelists and AB 
members), and the members of the WTO Secretariat that participate in proceedings.
21
 Nevertheless, 
we restrict our discussion to the former two categories.
22
 This is so, because information regarding the 
members of the Secretariat participating in proceedings as clerks is not available. Originally, the 
various documents issued in disputes mentioned the name of WTO officer acting as law clerk in 
disputes.
23
 Subsequently, nevertheless, the WTO Secretariat discontinued this practice.  
3.1 Parties to a Dispute 
WTO members have discretion to vary the intensity of their participation in a dispute. They can 
choose to act as complainants, or third party depending on considerations of their own. Their impact 
on the eventual decision will vary correspondingly. We explain.  
3.1.1 The Intensity of Participation 
A WTO member can autonomously decide whether it will act as complainant or third party. The 
decision is not inconsequential. Third parties have reduced rights before panels and the AB. First, their 
arguments do not have to be addressed by panels and/or the AB, which can conveniently disregard 
them. In practice, their arguments will be reflected in the factual part of reports. Second, third parties 
cannot appeal panel reports (Article 17.4 of DSU). Furthermore, WTO members cannot participate as 
third parties before the AB, unless if they have participated under the same capacity before a panel 
(Article 17.4 of DSU). The saving grace here is that WTO members that did not participate as third 
parties before a panel, can still participate as amici curiae before the AB. The AB ruled as much in 
favour of Morocco in EC-Sardines. 
Third parties do not have to intervene during proceedings. They can simply assist in the meeting 
(and receive the documents distributed in the first panel meeting and/or the only AB meeting with the 
                                                     
20
 This process aims to update the current DSU in light of experience earned from practice so far. It is formally delinked 
from the also ongoing but moribund Doha round. The WTO Secretariat has been periodically issuing documents 
explaining the progress during negotiations (TN/DS series), and the last comprehensive paper issued explaining the 
progress so far is WTO Doc. TN/DS/28 of December 4, 2015. 
21
 Article 27.1 of DSU puts leaves us with no doubt as to the institutional function of the WTO Secretariat to assist panel 
during proceedings.  
22
 This does not mean that we side with the view that the participation of WTO Secretariat in dispute settlement proceedings 
is inconsequential. For one, under Article 8.6 of DSU, the Secretariat has crucial role in proposing panelists, as we detail 
later in this Section. Furthermore, there are good reasons to believe that the WTO Secretariat participates quite actively in 
the preparation of reports. Nordström (2005), and Johannesson and Mavroidis (2015) have expressed similar views on 
this score.  
23
 Indeed, we have included these references in our data set. 
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parties, since, unlike panels, AB meets with the parties only once),
24
 they can make an oral statement, 
or a written statement as well. The Definitions Section of the AB Working Procedures
25
 distinguishes 
between third parties and third participants. Third party, in accordance with the WP:  
means any WTO Member who has notified the DSB of its substantial interest in the matter before 
the panel pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the DSU. 
Third participant, in the same document:  
means any third party that has filed a written submission pursuant to Rule 24(1); or any third party 
that appears at the oral hearing, whether or not it makes an oral statement at that hearing. 
The distinction is pertinent in light of the fact that some third parties might decide not to file before the 
AB. Third participants are hence, a sub-set of third parties: any third participant must be a third party; 
the opposite is not necessarily true, however. 
Participation as third party can, of course, comport other benefits. Brazil, and China used this 
institutional possibility quite actively, and thus accustomed the personnel of their delegations to the 
WTO procedures. 
WTO members, irrespective whether they act as complainants (defendants) or third parties, can 
autonomously decide on the composition of their delegation. Based on this decision, the AB opened 
the way in its report on EC-Bananas III to the possibility for WTO members to be represented by 
private attorneys before the WTO adjudicating bodies. 
With this in mind, we now turn to our data. 
3.1.2 Who Complains against Who? 
We kick off our discussion with a presentation of the litigating pairs, at the consultations- and the 
panel stage, and we also include a table with the most frequent bilateral disputes. Unsurprisingly, we 
find that the bigger markets are the most frequent targets, and act as defendants more frequently than 
they act as complainants themselves.  
  
                                                     
24
 Panels retain discretion to grant enhanced third party rights to applicants that can demonstrate an interest to this effect, see 
for example EC-Hormones here the panel upheld the request by Canada and the US to act as enhanced third party in each 
other’s complaint against the EU (§8.15), and the AB upheld the manner in which the panel had exercised discretion on 
this issue (§154). 
25
 WTO Doc. WT/AB/WP/6 of August 16, 2010. 
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Table 7: Who Complains Against Whom in Requests for Consultations? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Who Complains Against Whom in Requests for Establishment of a Panel? 
   
Respondent 
(Panel)  
  
BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
Complainant 
(Panel) 
BRIC 0 3 33 3 39 
DEV 2 26 34 10 72 
G2 33 19 37 32 121 
IND 8 11 57 14 90 
 
Total  43 59 161 59 322 
 
  
  Respondent  
  BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
 
Complainant 
BRIC 1 8 48 8 65 
DEV 7 45 57 17 126 
G2 53 33 63 55 204 
IND 17 18 72 26 133 
LDC 1 0 0 0 1 
 Total  79 104 240 106 529 
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Table 9: The Most Frequent Bilateral Disputes 
WTO Members # Disputes WTO Members # Disputes 
EU US 63 Dominican Republic Honduras 3 
China US 26 EU Guatemala 3 
Canada US 20 EU Honduras 3 
India EU 17 EU Norway 3 
Korea US 17 EU Panama 3 
Canada EU 15 Japan Korea 3 
Mexico US 15 Pakistan US 3 
Argentina EU 14 Argentina Peru 2 
Brazil US 14 Australia Philippines 2 
India US 14 Brazil Japan 2 
Japan US 14 Canada Korea 2 
Brazil EU 12 Chile Colombia 2 
China EU 11 Chile Peru 2 
Argentina US 10 China Japan 2 
Argentina Chile 7 Chinese Taipei India 2 
EU Japan 7 Costa Rica Dominican Republic 2 
EU Korea 7 Costa Rica Trinidad and Tobago 2 
EU Russia 7 Czech Republic Hungary 2 
Indonesia US 7 EU Pakistan 2 
Australia US 6 EU Peru 2 
EU Mexico 6 Ecuador Mexico 2 
Chile EU 5 India Turkey 2 
EU Thailand 5 Indonesia Japan 2 
Philippines US 5 Indonesia New Zealand 2 
Thailand US 5 Moldova Ukraine 2 
Brazil Canada 4 New Zealand US 2 
China Mexico 4 Russia Ukraine 2 
EU Indonesia 4 Turkey US 2 
Guatemala Mexico 4 US Venezuela 2 
Argentina Brazil 3 US Viet Nam 2 
Australia EU 3 
 
Canada China 3 
 
Canada Japan 3 
 
Chile US 3 
 
Colombia Panama 3 
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3.1.3 Frequency of Participation 
There is substantial literature regarding what are the factors influencing participation in the DSU.
26
 In 
fact, there is abundant literature, and it would be a quixotic test for us if we were to look for an 
exhaustive overview of the existing literature. In an effort to provide a flavour of the existing 
literature, we could mention some earlier efforts by Horn et al. (2005) to link participation to export 
trade shares, in the sense that the higher the volume of trade, the likelier that participation in dispute 
settlement proceedings will occur.
27
 Wickens (2009) explores whether bargaining power 
considerations can help explain participation. Nordström and Shaffer (2008) look into characteristics 
of those members with reduced bargaining power, such as the (lack of) capacity to determine trade 
barriers, the usually low monetary volumes associated with their trade. They conclude that 
participation of this type of countries (small developing countries) would be greatly enhanced if they 
could submit their disputes to small claims tribunals, that would provide fast relief. In similar vein, 
Conti (2010) looks into the manner in which presence or absence of legal expertise in national 
administrations affects participation in proceedings. More recently, Mavroidis and Sapir (2015) 
examine to what extent participation in free trade areas reduces the volume of disputes trading partners 
had experienced between them. 
We start the presentation of our data with a Table explaining the propensity to join in consultations. 
Under the DSU, when an (original) complainant requests consultations, it must submit its request to 
both the designated defendant, as well as the WTO Secretariat. The latter will circulate it to the 
membership. Any member which wishes to act as co-complainant, can do so at this moment. The 
defendant nevertheless, must accede to this request (Article 4.11 of DSU). Even if the defendant 
refuses to accede though, there is still a gain for the eventual co-complainant(s), since they have now 
received information that they were not aware of before. In a way thus, multilateralization of Requests 
for Consultation subsidizes those WTO members that have hard time to detect (illegal) trade barriers, 
and process their (in-)consistency with the WTO. Information is a costly commodity, after all. 
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 We are focusing on participation as complainant here. Defendants do not have discretion, since they are targets of 
actions.  
27
 Horn et al. (2005) 
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Table 10: Propensity to Join in Consultations by Group 
Complainant Respondent 
Request for 
consultations 
Request to 
join consultations 
Total 
Propensity to 
join 
BRIC 
BRIC 1 0 1 0.0 
DEV 8 6 14 42.9 
G2 48 93 141 66.0 
IND 8 2 10 20.0 
 
Total 65 101 166 60.8 
      
DEV 
BRIC 7 9 16 56.3 
DEV 45 51 96 53.1 
G2 57 114 171 66.7 
IND 17 66 83 79.5 
 
Total 126 240 366 65.6 
      
G2 
BRIC 53 123 176 69.9 
DEV 33 71 104 68.3 
G2 63 143 206 69.4 
IND 55 46 101 45.5 
 
Total 204 383 587 65.2 
      
IND 
BRIC 17 70 87 80.5 
DEV 18 32 50 64.0 
G2 72 174 246 70.7 
IND 26 32 58 55.2 
 
Total 133 308 441 69.8 
      
LDC BRIC 1 1 2 50.0 
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Figure 9: The Groups Acting as Complainants in Requests for Consultations in Time-Series 
Mode  
 
Figure 10: The Groups Acting as Defendants in Requests for Consultations in Time Series Mode  
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The data presented above seems consistent with the idea that export trade shares matter for 
participation purposes. Whereas the G2 dominated the early years of the WTO dispute settlement, 
acting as complainant in a very healthy percentage of cases, its share of disputes has dwindled over 
time. At the same time, the rise of China as a force to be reckoned with in international trade, has been 
accompanied by a surge in the number of disputes it has raised.  
3.1.4 Winners and Losers 
We now move to discuss whether, irrespective of their frequency of participation, WTO members win 
or lose symmetrically before the WTO adjudicating bodies. To do that, we need to establish our 
benchmark for ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’, our unit of account so to speak. This is far from being obvious, 
as we really need to transcend the ostensible in this respect.  
Take for example, Mexico-Telecoms. In this case, US complains and wins its dispute to the effect 
that, the Mexican owner of telecoms network, Telmex, was contravening its obligations under the 
Telecoms Reference Paper. Mexico did not appeal the report. The US emerged victorious from the 
dispute, but did Mexico lose? The Mexican government was now in position to request from Telmex 
to change its access pricing policy, without being accused that it was taming on its own initiative an 
important player, that might be contributing to the government itself. Mexico could use GATT as an 
excuse to do something it wanted to do anyway itself, since the gains for consumer welfare resulting 
from the lowering of prices were quite substantial. 
In similar vein, in EC-Bananas III, Ecuador, one of the complainants, won, and EU, the defendant 
lost, at least on paper. Did Ecuador win though? For Ecuador trade in bananas represents a substantial 
percentage of its GDP (gross domestic product), and EU one of its most lucrative markets. Well, it lost 
the EU market for more than twenty years, since the EU changed its policy only in 2011.
28
 Ecuador 
never received any compensation for the loss of trade during these years, and, wisely, did not make 
matters worse for it by imposing countermeasures, as it could against the EU. Did the EU lose? Well, 
its member states concerned placated the domestic lobby they cared about (distributors of bananas) by 
refusing to compromise and implement an adverse AB ruling, ‘buying’ thus their political support for 
twenty years.  
We could go on and cite many similar examples. And it is not political economy only that makes 
the pronouncement of a winner and loser a judgment call. Think of a case where a WTO member 
invokes various provisions, and prevails in some and not in others. How do we distinguish between 
‘important’ and ‘unimportant’ claims in similar scenarios? The simple point we want to drive home is 
this: deciding on overall winners and losers is risky business. This is why we have used a different 
benchmark to decide on this score, the individual claims presented. According to Article 6.2 of the 
DSU, as interpreted in the AB report on Korea-Dairy Products, a Request for Establishment of a Panel 
must include all claims, that is, all factual situations a complainant complains about, and the legal 
provision they run counter. It is true that WTO panels, and the AB, can decide on fewer than the total 
number of claims on judicial economy grounds, since, their mandate as per Article 7.1 of DSU is: 
to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the 
rulings provided for in that/those agreement(s).  
Judicial economy nevertheless, does not negatively affect our chosen approach, since it cuts across all 
cases, and there is no evidence that it is exercised asymmetrically across players. 
With these explanations in mind we now turn to our data. 
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 Guth (2012). 
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Figure 11: Percentage of Successful Claims as Complainant or Defendant by Group 
 
We disaggregate the information included in this Figure into the following two tables.  
Table 11: Percentage of Successful Claims as Complainant by Group 
  
Respondent 
(Panel)  
  
BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
Complainant 
(Panel) 
BRIC 
 
69.0 46.7 37.0 47.3 
DEV 
 
82.3 63.2 38.8 65.9 
G2 69.4 92.4 65.0 73.5 69.6 
IND 79.4 55.0 60.8 70.0 61.9 
Table 12: Percentage of Successful Claims as Respondent by Group 
  
Complainant 
(Panel)  
  
BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
Respondent 
(Panel) 
BRIC   30.3 20.6 28.9 
DEV 31.0 17.7 7.6 45.0 24.3 
G2 53.3 36.8 35.0 39.2 41.5 
IND 63.0 61.2 26.5 30.0 37.5 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Percent
IND
G2
DEV
BRIC
Complainant Respondent
Average share of successful claims as
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Remarkably, the percentage of winning complainants increases substantially so, when it is the DG, 
and not the parties, that appoints panelists.
29
 
Table 13: Percentage of Successful Claims as Complainant when DG or Parties Decide on 
Composition of Panelists (Aggregate Results) 
 
DG Parties 
Complainant 64.7 52.2 
Respondent 35.3 47.8 
Our data thus, seems supports the view that there is a process of self-selection of disputes. WTO 
members pick winners, and do not litigate ad nauseam. Furthermore, the percentage of victories is 
almost symmetrically distributed across the various groups, lending thus support to the view that legal 
expertise can be easily outsourced. 
3.1.5 Third Parties 
As we have already explained, Articles 10, and 17.4 of DSU allow for third party participation of 
WTO members to disputes raised by other members. Note that none of the two provisions mentioned 
here assumes what the position of third parties is. As a result, there are examples of third parties’ 
submissions siding with the complainant, as there are others siding with the defendant. In what 
follows, we provide information regarding the identity of third party participation before panels and 
the AB.  
Table 14: Third Parties before Panels 
Third party 
No of Members who have 
been Third parties 
Number of Third party 
appearances for group 
Group’s share of all 
Third party appearances 
BRIC 4 258 15.5 
DEV 54 606 36.4 
G2 2 209 12.5 
IND 15 578 34.7 
LDC 6 15 0.9 
Total 81 1666 100 
*Third party frequency is not based on bilateral disputes. Hence, a third party is only counted once for 
each distinct DS number. 
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 We discuss the procedures for appointing panelists in 3.2 in this Section. 
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Table 15: Third Parties before the AB 
Third party 
No. of Members 
who have been 
Third parties 
Number of Third 
party appearances 
for group 
Group’s share of all 
Third party 
appearances 
BRIC 4 124 16.6 
DEV 36 230 30.7 
G2 2 95 12.7 
IND 12 293 39.2 
LDC 4 6 0.8 
Total 58 748 100 
*Third party frequency is not based on bilateral disputes. Hence, a Third party is only counted once for 
each distinct DS number. However, the joint submissions in DS267 and DS165 are counted for each 
individual WTO Member. 
3.2 Judges 
WTO judges are divided into panelists (serving panels, that is the ‘first instance WTO courts’), and 
AB members (serving the AB, the ‘second instance WTO court’). The process for selecting each of the 
two categories differs, as we explain in what follows. The process of selection is, of course, not the 
only area of interest when it comes to understanding the role and function of WTO judges in the 
adjudication process. Ideally we would like to have information about the role of the WTO Secretariat 
in drafting reports, the remuneration of judges, the manner in which personal conflicts are managed at 
the WTO-level, the background of judges,
30
 etc. Alas, the standing increase in the amount of 
information notwithstanding, we have to rely on secondary sources in order to shed light on say 
remuneration,
31
 and/or the role of the Secretariat.
32
 This is why we have limited our work to the areas 
we can systematically research, such as, the origin of judges, the frequency of their appointment, and, 
when it comes to panelists only, whether they have been appointed by the parties or the DG. 
Recall that panelists can appear as members of the original panel, the compliance panel, and as 
Arbitrator to decide on the level of compensation under Article 22.6 of DSU. If there is no 
supervening conflict or event that makes their appearance an impossibility, the members of the 
original panel will also compose the compliance panel, as well as the Arbitration body. AB members, 
besides serving on the AB are routinely appointed as arbitrators to decide the reasonable period of 
time within which compliance should occur.
33
 
With this in mind, we first discuss the legal framework in place for appointing judges, before we 
move to present our data.  
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 To be fair, there is some information about education and professional experience of panelists, and even more for AB 
members. It is nonetheless, highly asymmetric. As a result, including similar reference into the data set would give the 
wrong impression regarding the background of the totality of especially panelists. 
31
 Johannesson and Mavroidis (2015); Pauwelyn (2015). 
32
 Nordström (2005). 
33
 Mavroidis et al. (2017) provide an exhaustive data set on this score. 
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3.2.1 The Process for Selecting Panelists 
According to Article 8.1 of DSU: 
Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals, 
including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of 
a Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or 
Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or 
published on international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a 
Member. 
Expertise is not the only relevant criterion. Panelists must exhibit demonstrable independence (Article 
8.2 of DSU), a quality that is better appreciated were one to take into account that many panelists, as 
per Article 8.1 of DSU and in practice, are members of delegations to the WTO. To this effect, they 
have to sign a document whereby they are required to indicate any existing or supervening conflict.
34
 
The requirement for independence is further strengthened through Article 8.3 of DSU, which bars 
nationals of complainants and defendants, and even third parties to a dispute from acting as panellists, 
unless of course, parties to the dispute have agreed
35
 to their selection.
36
 
The WTO Secretariat will keep a list of potential panellists, that is, a pool of individuals from 
which panelists to a specific dispute will be selected (Article 8.4 of DSU). The list is thus, of 
indicative nature, since inclusion does not automatically lead to selection. The list comprises both 
governmental as well as nongovernmental potential panelists. It is WTO members that propose 
individuals to be included in the list during the regular DSB meetings, and they can indicate whether 
the proposed individuals are experts in one or more areas of WTO law. To our knowledge, no proposal 
for inclusion in the list has been thwarted so far, probably because inclusion is inconsequential. 
Following the request for establishment of a panel, the secretariat will meet the parties in order to 
compose the panel. To this effect, it will propose names that the parties can reject only for compelling 
reasons (Article 8.6 of DSU). There is no case law on this score, although proposals by the Secretariat 
are routinely rejected, otherwise there we would not be witnessing request to the DG to complete the 
panel, as we detail in what follows. Note that the Secretariat can propose even nonroster panelists, that 
is, individuals that have not been proposed for inclusion to the roster by WTO members. A panel will 
be composed of three or five panelists (Article 8.5 of DSU). In the WTO-era panels have always been 
composed of three individuals so far, and it is only in the early GATT years that panels had been 
composed of five persons.  
If parties to the dispute do not manage to agree on one or more panelists within twenty days 
counting from the day of establishment of the panel, they can request from the DG to complete or 
appoint the full panel (Article 8.7 of DSU). The DG will do so within ten days, after consulting the 
Chairman of DSB, as well as the Chairman of the relevant Council or Committee.
37
 
It becomes quite obvious from our discussion above that the Secretariat is quite influential in panel 
appointments. Officials of the WTO have the right to propose, and the DG has a right to decide on 
                                                     
34
 WTO Doc. WT/DSB/RC/1 of December 11, 1996. This document includes the Rules of Conduct that not only panelists, 
and AB members, but also experts appearing before the WTO courts, as well as members of the WTO Secretariat must 
observe. 
35
 This has happened only exceptionally, for example in US-Zeroing (EC), where the parties to the dispute (EU, US) agreed 
to the selection of two of their nationals (Hans Beseler, EU; William J. Davey, US) to serve as panelists. 
36
 Nationality is of course, not necessarily a reason for bias. Nevertheless, there is some intellectual legitimacy in this 
provision, since the majority of panelists, as Johannesson and Mavroidis (2015) have shown, are in the service of 
governmental function. 
37
 In disputes involving alleges inconsistencies with the Antidumping Agreement for example, the DG will consult with the 
Chair of the Council for Trade in Goods, as well as the Chair for the Antidumping Committee. 
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appointments.
38
 This is not the case when it comes to appointing AB members, as we detail in what 
immediately follows. 
3.2.2 The Process for Selecting AB Members  
The AB comprises seven members appointed for a mandate of four years renewable once (Article 17.1 
DSU). Candidates must correspond to the requirements embedded in Article 17.3 of DSU, which 
largely reflect the corresponding discussion we have already entertained regarding the selection of 
panelists: 
The AB shall comprise persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, 
international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally. They shall be 
unaffiliated with any government. The AB membership shall be broadly representative of 
membership in the WTO. All persons serving on the AB shall be available at all times and on short 
notice, and shall stay abreast of dispute settlement activities and other relevant activities of the 
WTO. They shall not participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or 
indirect conflict of interest. 
Originally, that is, at the time when the first AB was composed, a Preparatory Committee was 
established (where delegates at the DSB could participate) in order to decide on the selection process 
for the members of the AB. Following a recommendation by this body, the DSB decided that an organ 
be established comprising the DG of the WTO, and the Chairmen of the General Council, the DSB, 
the CTG (Council for Trade in Goods), the CTS (Council for Trade in Services), and the TRIPs (trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights) Council. This organ would be receiving propositions for 
nominations by WTO members, and, at the end, propose to the DSB its nominees. It is the DSB that 
would appoint the members of the AB.
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Art. 17.1 DSU states that three rotating members of the AB (a division) will hear a case. The 
formula for selection of a division is not reflected in the DSU or in its Working Procedures, and is 
unknown to the wider public (Rule 6 of the Working Procedures).
40
 A presiding member for each 
division will be selected (Rule 7). Although a division hears and decides a particular case (Rule 3), a 
practice of collegiality has developed. In an effort to promote consistency and coherence in decision-
making, Rule 4 reflects the so-called collegiality-requirement. According to its §3, the members of a 
division will exchange views with members of the AB who do not participate in their division, on the 
resolution of the dispute before them. It is the Division alone that will, of course, take the final 
decision. 
3.2.3 Data Regarding Panelists 
We start our discussion here with information regarding the question who appoints panelists, the 
parties to the dispute or the DG? In our view, this information is crucial for understanding (and avoid 
underestimating) the influence that the WTO Secretariat has on this score. 
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 This procedure is unlike that applicable in investment arbitration, where parties to the dispute appoint one arbitrator each, 
and the two appointed arbitrators decide on the umpire, see Pauwelyn (2015) on this score. There is anecdotal evidence 
that parties to a WTO dispute have very exceptionally preempted the Secretariat’s discretion to propose, by agreeing 
between them on panelists.  
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 Anecdotally, it seems that on its appointment, each member of the AB receives a number. A combination of three 
numbers, rotating according to a secret formula, will hear appeals as they are coming to the AB. For example, numbers 1, 
2 and 5 will hear appeal against DS 1, numbers 2, 6 and 9 will hear appeals against DS 2 and so on. What is unknown is 
the formula for rotating the divisions. 
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Table 16: Frequency of Appointment by Parties and DG 
Appointment by Freq. Percent 
DG 172 66.9 
Parties 85 33.1 
Total 257 100 
We now move to present data on the nationality of selected panelists, as well as on the frequency of 
appointment. Panelists do not enjoy a time-bound mandate like AB members do, and frequency of 
appointment is one criterion to measure their expertise to deal with issues coming under the purview 
of the WTO agreement. 
Figure 12: National Origin of Panelists by Group 
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Table 17: National Origin of Panelists and Frequency of Appointment by Individual WTO 
Member 
IND Freq. Percent DEV Freq. Percent BRIC Freq. Percent 
New Zealand 70 9.1 South Africa 37 4.8 India 31 4.0 
Switzerland 62 8.0 Chile 33 4.3 Brazil 25 3.2 
Canada 43 5.6 Uruguay 26 3.4 Total 56 7.3 
Australia 42 5.4 Venezuela 25 3.2 
   
Mexico 25 3.2 Colombia 22 2.9 G2 Freq. Percent 
Singapore 25 3.2 Argentina 18 2.3 US 18 2.3 
Hong Kong 20 2.6 Pakistan 16 2.1 
   
Norway 18 2.3 Egypt 13 1.7    
Japan 14 1.8 Philippines 13 1.7    
Poland 14 1.8 Thailand 10 1.3    
Israel 13 1.7 Costa Rica 8 1.0    
Iceland 12 1.6 Jamaica 6 0.8    
Czech Republic 11 1.4 Barbados 5 0.6    
Germany 10 1.3 Ecuador 5 0.6    
Korea 9 1.2 Morocco 5 0.6    
Sweden 9 1.2 Indonesia 3 0.4 
   
UK 7 0.9 Belize 2 0.3 
   
Belgium 5 0.6 Guatemala 2 0.3 
   
Finland 5 0.6 Malaysia 2 0.3 
   
France 3 0.4 Mauritius 2 0.3 
   
Ireland 3 0.4 Peru 2 0.3 
   
Hong Kong 2 0.3 Taiwan 2 0.3 
   
Hungary 2 0.3 Panama 1 0.1 
   
Italy 2 0.3 Saudi Arabia 1 0.1 
   
Portugal 2 0.3 Total 259 33.6 
   
Slovenia 2 0.3 
      
Austria 1 0.1 
      
Bulgaria 1 0.1 
      
Netherlands 1 0.1 
      
Total 433 56.2 
      
Table 18: Frequency of Appointment of Panelists by Group  
Panelists Freq. Percent 
IND 433 56.2 
DEV 259 33.6 
BRIC 56 7.3 
G2 18 2.3 
LDC 5 0.6 
Total 771 100 
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Table 19: Frequency of Appointment of Chairs by Group  
1995‒2015  2011‒2015 
Panel Chairman Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent 
IND 145 56.4  23 39.7 
DEV 83 32.3  30 51.7 
BRIC 17 6.6  2 3.4 
G2 12 4.7  3 5.2 
Total 257 100  58 100 
Table 20: Number of Repeat Panelists  
Number of panels that the 
panelist has served on Chair Non-chair Total no. of panelists 
1 36 100 119 
2 24 41 53 
3 8 37 39 
4 4 15 17 
5 6 16 20 
6 8 7 10 
7 4 4 6 
8 2 2 3 
9  1 1 
10  6 6 
11 1 
 
1 
12  1 1 
13 
 
1 1 
14 
 
1 1 
15 
   
16 
 
1 1 
Total 93 233 279 
3.2.4 Data Regarding AB Members 
As already explained, AB members are appointed to serve by using a secret formula to this effect. The 
frequency thus, of their appointment depends on this formula, and, as a result, there are no dramatic 
discrepancies in the number of appearances across members of the AB. It could, of course, be the case 
that a particular member has a conflict and excuses itself from adjudicating a particular dispute. 
Similar occurrences nevertheless, are quite infrequent, and to some extent anticipated through the 
choices to appoint members.  
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Table 21: Nationality of AB Members
41
 
US  4 
EU  3 
Japan  3 
China  2 
Egypt  2 
India  2 
Korea  2 
Philippines 2 
Australia 1 
Brazil  1 
Mexico  1 
New Zealand 1 
Uruguay 1 
South Africa  1 
Table 22: Nationality of AB Members by Group 
G2 7 
IND 8 
BRIC 5 
DEV 6 
 
Table 23: Frequency of Appointment of AB Members 
AB Member Appeals 
James Bacchus 34 
Georges-Michel Abi-Saab 28 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann 27 
Julio Lacarte-Muró 27 
A.V. Ganesan 25 
Florentino P. Feliciano 25 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 24 
Yasuhei Taniguchi 20 
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 We include in the data the two recent appointments that were decided on November 23, 2016, of Ms Zhao Hong (China), 
and Hyun Chong Kim (Korea). 
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4. The Subject-Matter 
The subject-matter of disputes is defined by the complainant. It is for the complainant to decide 
whether to litigate, and under what terms. In what follows, we include information regarding 
agreements and provisions invoked at the consultations-stage.
42
 The reason is that complainants cannot 
add new claims after they have issued their Request for Consultations. This is the case because of case 
law construction, and not because of statutory discipline. The AB has stated in its report on US-
Shrimp (Thailand) at §293 that: 
 [a]s long as the complaining party does not expand the scope of the dispute, [it would] hesitate to 
impose too rigid a standard for the ‘precise and exact identity’ between the scope of the 
consultations and the request for the establishment of a panel, as this would substitute the request 
for consultations for the panel request”. The Appellate Body has also held that a “precise and exact 
identity” of measures between the two requests is not necessary, “provided that the ‘essence’ of 
the challenged measures had not changed.” In our view, whether a complaining party has 
“expand[ed] the scope of the dispute” or changed the “essence” of the dispute through the 
inclusion of a measure in its panel request that was not part of its consultations request must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. (emphasis in the original) 
As a result, when the complainant submits a Request for Establishment of panel, it will at most include 
the claims it had included in its Request for Consultations. The terms of reference for panels are 
explained in Article 7.1 of DSU: 
Panels shall have the following terms of reference unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise 
within 20 days from the establishment of the panel: 
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by 
the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document ... and to 
make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings 
provided for in that/those agreement(s). 
This does not mean that panels (and/or the AB) must agree with the legal qualification of facts as 
presented by the complainant. We need to distinguish between factual matter and legal issues though. 
In application of the Roman maxim (accepted in WTO case law through US-Wool Shirts and Blouses) 
actori incumbit probatio, it is the complainant that has the burden to prove the facts. It is courts on the 
other hand, as per the other foundational Roman maxi, jura novit curia, that are in charge of deciding 
on the correct legal basis and the subjugation of facts under it. This means that a discrepancy between 
what has been submitted, and what the final decision might include, since, for example, it could be 
that the complainant invoked the wrong legal basis. It could also be that, based on judicial economy 
grounds, panels (and/or the AB) decide not to discuss some of the issues invoked.  
In similar vein, the Notice of Appeal before the AB can at best include the issues decided by the 
panel the report of which is being appealed (Article 16.4 of DSU). 
With this in mind, we turn now to the data.  
4.1 Invoking Agreements 
We kick off the presentation of our data in this respect with a presentation of aggregate results 
regarding the invocation of the three foundational agreements of the WTO, namely the GATT, the 
GATS, and the TRIPs, before we move to discuss some of the most frequently invoked agreements of 
Annex 1A (e.g., agreements on trade in goods, and thus, annexed to the GATT). The reason why we 
do not include information of agreements annexed to say trade in services is that, as can be easily 
observed, agreements on trade in goods almost monopolize the subject-matter of disputes before the 
WTO. There are many reasons why this has been the case that we do not need to get into for the 
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purposes of this paper. Furthermore, we discuss only some of the Annex 1A agreements, namely the 
agreements regarding contingent protection (Antidumping, AD; Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, SCM; and Safeguards, SG), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), and the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). These five are the most frequently invoked 
agreements and the difference between invocations of these five and any other agreement belonging to 
Annex 1A is very substantial.  
Table 24: Frequency of Invocations of WTO Agreements in Requests for Consultations 
(Aggregate Results) 
Cited Agreement Frequency Percent 
GATT 424 35 
Antidumping (AD) 121 10 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 117 10 
Agriculture (AG) 85 7 
WTO 62 5 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 51 4 
Import‐Licensing Procedures (ILA) 50 4 
Safeguards (SG) 47 4 
Sanitary and Phyto‐Sanitary Measures (SPS) 44 4 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 44 4 
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 34 3 
Trade in Services (GATS) 28 2 
Protocol of Accession of the People’s Republic of China 22 2 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 18 1 
Customs Valuation (CV) 17 1 
Textiles and Clothing (ATP) 16 1 
Rules of Origin (ROO) 7 1 
Preshipment Inspection (PI) 5 0 
Enabling Clause 4 0 
Government Procurement (GPA) 4 0 
Paris Convention 2 0 
1979 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, 
Dispute Settlement and Surveillance 
1 0 
GATT 1947 1 0 
Ministerial Decision Regarding Cases Where Customs 
Administrations Have Reasons to Doubt the Truth or 
Accuracy of Declared Value 
1 0 
WTO Decision on Notification Procedures 1 0 
Total 1,206 100 
*The number of times various WTO Agreements have been invoked in Request for Consultations. No 
account is taken to how many articles are invoked under each agreement. This table is to show the 
prevalence of agreements in Request for Consultation.  
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Table 25: Frequency of Invocations of GATT in Requests for Consultations by Group 
Agreement Complainant Respondent 
 
  
BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
GATT 
BRIC 1 5 40 4 50 
DEV 7 41 49 15 112 
G2 46 25 40 36 147 
IND 15 15 64 20 114 
LDC 1 0 0 0 1 
 
Total 70 86 193 75 424 
Table 26: Frequency of Invocations of GATS in Requests for Consultations by Group 
       
Agreement Complainant Respondent  
  BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
AG 
BRIC 0 1 5 0 6 
DEV 2 3 6 4 15 
G2 7 7 8 13 35 
IND 5 4 10 10 29 
 
Total 14 15 29 27 85 
Table 27: Frequency of Invocations of TRIPs in Requests for Consultations by Group 
Agreement Complainant Respondent  
  BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
GATS 
BRIC 0 0 1 0 1 
DEV 0 2 7 1 10 
G2 5 0 4 4 13 
IND 1 0 2 1 4 
 
Total 6 2 14 6 28 
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Table 28: Frequency of Invocations of Select Annex 1A Agreements (trade in Goods) in Requests 
for Consultations by Group 
AG, TRIMs, TBT, SPS, AD, SCM, SG 
       
Agreement Complainant Respondent  
  BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
TRIMs 
BRIC 0 0 3 0 3 
DEV 0 0 6 0 6 
G2 11 8 1 4 24 
IND 5 3 1 2 11 
 
Total 16 11 11 6 44 
       
TRIPs 
BRIC 0 0 3 0 3 
DEV 0 0 0 5 5 
G2 5 4 10 5 24 
IND 0 0 2 0 2 
 
Total 5 4 15 10 34 
 
Agreement Complainant Respondent  
  BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
SPS 
BRIC 0 1 2 0 3 
DEV 0 1 4 4 9 
G2 4 0 4 8 16 
IND 0 0 8 8 16 
 
Total 4 2 18 20 44 
       
TBT 
BRIC 0 2 2 0 4 
DEV 1 0 9 6 16 
G2 1 2 7 4 14 
IND 1 1 14 1 17 
 
Total 3 5 32 11 51 
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Agreement Complainant Respondent 
 
  
BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
AD 
BRIC 1 4 20 2 27 
DEV 3 9 15 3 30 
G2 8 2 9 5 24 
IND 2 9 27 1 39 
LDC 1 0 0 0 1 
 
Total 15 24 71 11 121 
       
SCM 
BRIC 0 1 18 3 22 
DEV 1 1 8 0 10 
G2 16 5 18 14 53 
IND 7 1 21 3 32 
 
Total 24 8 65 20 117 
       
SG 
BRIC 0 0 2 1 3 
DEV 0 17 3 0 20 
G2 0 4 5 1 10 
IND 0 3 9 2 14 
 
Total 0 24 19 4 47 
It is quite remarkable that twenty years on the WTO dispute settlement experience, disputes 
concerning practice in the realm of contingent protection instruments continue to represent a very high 
percentage of the overall litigation under the auspices of the WTO. 
4.2 Invoking Provisions 
In parallel with the discussion above, we first look into invocations of provisions of the three 
foundational agreements (GATT, GATS, TRIPs), before we move to discuss invocations of provisions 
of the five most frequently used Annex 1A agreements.  
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Table 29: Frequency of Invocations of GATT Provisions (Aggregate Results) 
GATT 
 Articles   Freq.* Percent 
I (MFN) 139 10.88 
II 118 9.23 
III (NT) 224 17.53 
IX 4 0.31 
V 23 1.8 
VI 165 12.91 
VII 25 1.96 
VIII 25 1.96 
X 149 11.66 
XI 128 10.02 
XIII 59 4.62 
XIX 53 4.15 
XV 2 0.16 
XVI 11 0.86 
XVII 9 0.7 
XVIII 8 0.63 
XX 9 0.7 
XXI 2 0.16 
XXIII 104 8.14 
XXIV 8 0.63 
XXVIII 10 0.78 
Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII 1 0.08 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II 1 0.08 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII 1 0.08 
Total 1278 100 
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Table 30: Frequency of Invocations of GATS Provisions (Aggregate Results) 
GATS 
Articles Freq.* Percent 
I 1 1 
II (MFN) 18 17.5 
III 3 2.9 
IV 5 4.9 
VI 9 8.7 
VIII 2 1.9 
XI 2 1.9 
XVI (Market Access) 23 22.3 
XVII (NT) 26 25.2 
XVIII 4 3.9 
XXIII 3 2.9 
TRP 4 3.9 
Annex on Movement of Natural 
Persons Supplying Services 
1 1 
Annex on Telecommunications 2 1.9 
Total 103 100 
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Table 31: Frequency of Invocations of TRIPs Provisions (Aggregate Results) 
TRIPs     
Articles Freq.* Percent  Articles Freq.* Percent 
1 4 2.1  28 6 3.2 
2 10 5.3  31 3 1.6 
3 (NT) 11 5.8  33 3 1.6 
4 (MFN) 4 2.1  34 1 0.5 
7 1 0.5  39 3 1.6 
8 1 0.5  41 9 4.8 
9 5 2.7  42 5 2.7 
10 2 1.1  46 1 0.5 
11 2 1.1  49 2 1.1 
12 2 1.1  50 7 3.7 
13 2 1.1  51 2 1.1 
14 5 2.7  52 1 0.5 
15 5 2.7  53 2 1.1 
16 8 4.2  54 1 0.5 
17 1 0.5  55 1 0.5 
18 1 0.5  58 1 0.5 
19 1 0.5  59 2 1.1 
20 8 4.2  61 4 2.1 
21 1 0.5  62 2 1.1 
22 5 2.7  63 6 3.2 
24 5 2.7  65 19 10.1 
27 11 5.8  70 13 6.9 
    Total 189 100 
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Table 32: Frequency of Invocations of Annex 1A( Trade in Goods) Agreements (Aggregate 
Results) 
TBT 
 
SPS 
Articles Freq.* Percent 
 
Articles Freq.* Percent 
1 1 0.8 
 
1 2 0.3 
2 79 61.7 
 
2 62 21.2 
3 3 2.3 
 
3 27 9.3 
5 27 21.1 
 
4 8 2.7 
6 4 3.1 
 
5 93 31.9 
7 2 1.6 
 
6 18 6.2 
8 1 0.8 
 
7 17 5.8 
9 1 0.8 
 
8 19 6.5 
12 7 5.5 
 
10 5 1.7 
15 1 0.8 
 
13 1 0.3 
16 1 0.8 
 
Annex B 20 6.9 
22 1 0.8 
 
Annex C 20 6.9 
Total 128 100 
 
Total 292 100 
*The number of times various articles have been invoked in the Request for Consultations by the 
original complainants. An Article is counted only once even if referred to several times. Hence, if 
for instance SCM or AD, Arts. 3.1 and 3.2 have been both invoked, the Table counts this as one 
invocation of Art. 3. Equivalently, if for instance GATT Art. III.1 and III.2 have been both 
invoked; the Table counts this as one invocation of Art. III 
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Table 33: Frequency of Invocations of Provisions in the AD, SCM, and SG Agreements 
AD 
Article Freq. Percent 
1 78 5.0 
2 241 15.4 
3 247 15.8 
4 31 2.0 
5 153 9.8 
6 281 18.0 
7 39 2.5 
8 15 1.0 
9 109 7.0 
10 9 0.6 
11 66 4.2 
12 90 5.8 
15 7 0.4 
15 13 0.8 
16 1 0.1 
17 5 0.3 
18 97 6.2 
19 1 0.1 
Annex I 6 0.4 
Annex II 75 4.8 
Total 1564 100 
 
SCM 
Articles Freq. Percent 
1 66 8.57 
2 37 4.81 
3 93 12.08 
4 24 3.12 
5 41 5.32 
6 53 6.88 
7 13 1.69 
10 49 6.36 
11 60 7.79 
12 40 5.19 
13 8 1.04 
14 23 2.99 
15 54 7.01 
16 4 0.52 
17 16 2.08 
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18 11 1.43 
19 39 5.06 
20 2 0.26 
21 26 3.38 
22 23 2.99 
25 9 1.17 
27 11 1.43 
28 2 0.26 
30 1 0.13 
32 56 7.27 
Annex I 6 0.78 
Annex II 2 0.26 
Annex III 1 0.13 
Total 770 100 
 
SG 
Articles Freq. Percent 
2 56 15.26 
3 49 13.35 
4 99 26.98 
5 41 11.17 
6 13 3.54 
7 24 6.54 
8 14 3.81 
9 12 3.27 
11 14 3.81 
12 45 12.26 
Total 367 100 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Our data covers many issues we could not, for reasons of space constraints, highlight here. We tried to 
focus on some of its salient features. The WTO dispute settlement system has entered the twenty-third 
year of its existence. It has provoked diametrically opposite reactions across commentators. It has been 
hailed as the ‘crown jewel’ of the system, but also criticized for failing to ‘complete’ the contract 
through methodologically sound reasoning and understanding of the various provisions. It has been 
heralded as promoting compliance, but also been criticized for doing the opposite by insisting on 
forward looking compliance, that is, be continuously recommending prospective remedies.
43
  
Irrespective of the criticism though, one thing is clear. The WTO dispute settlement system remains 
the only comprehensive compulsory third party adjudication regime, a means to promote peaceful 
resolution in the old Hullian approach. And there is no signs of abandoning it either. Independent 
research by Li and Qiu (2015), looking into over one hundred free trade areas, and Mavroidis and 
Sapir (2015), looking into the behavior of the G2, confirms that, even though preferential partners tend 
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 Wu (2015) offers thoughts in this respect.  
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to reduce (sometimes) drastically their litigation before the WTO, this is not because they have 
decided to divert their litigation to a different forum. The WTO continues to be the privileged forum 
for solving trade disputes. This is probably its greatest strength.  
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